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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action on a promissory note from
Appellants to Respondent, and Appellants' Counterclaim
for damages for breach of a construction contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court (Judge David B. Dee) granted
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on the promissory
note and entered judgment accordingly, but in a separate
Memorandum Decision refused to tax as costs the costs of
taking Appellants' depositions.
was tried to a jury.

Appellants' Cotmterclaim

The lower court (Judge Marcellus K.

Snow) sustained Respondent's objections to the admissibility of certain evidence offered by Appellants, whereupon Appellants rested.

The lower court then granted Re-

spondent's motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment on the Counterclaim in favor of Respondent and against
Appellants, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
AND CROSS-APPEAL
Respondent seeks:
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1.

With respect to Appellants' Counterclaim, affirmation of the judgment
in favor of Respondent and against
Appellants, no cause of action.

2.

Reversal of the Memorandum Decision
refusing to tax the costs of taking
Appellants' depositions and judgment
with respect thereto in its favor,
as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Official Report of Proceedings in the Trial
Court will be referred to throughout this Brief by the
letter "T" followed by the number of the specific page
or pages referred to.

Exhibits will be referred to as

"EX" followed by the number of the specific exhibit or exhibits referred to.

The Defendants-Appellants and the

Plaintiff-Respondent will be referred to throughout as
"Owners" and "Contractor," respectively.
As stated in the first paragraph of the Statement
of Facts at page 3 of the Owners' brief, on or about August
28, 1972, the parties entered into a Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, EX D-3 (the "Contract").
However, contrary to the Statement of the Owners, construction of the nursing facility was originally to be completed
on or before June 15, 1973 rather than June 15, 1972.
Article 3 of the Contract.
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See

As stated in the third paragraph of the Statement of Facts on page 3 of the Owners' brief, completion
of the drawings and specifications contemplated by the Contract was delayed.

However, contrary to the Statement of

the Owners, the issue of who was responsible for such delay
was resolved on or about January 3, 1973 by the parties'
entering into Change Order No. 1 to the Contract, which
Change Order extended the Date of Completion of construction
until August l, 1973.

See EX D-14.

As stated in the Statement of Facts in the fourth
paragraph on page 4 of the Owners' brief, the parties entered
into Change Order No. 2 to the Contract.

EX D-10.

Change

Order No. 2 was entered into on or about August 27, 1973.
However, contrary to the Statement of the Owners that the·
Owners had a valid claim against the Contractor for the delay
in completion of construction, by Change Order No. 2, the
parties memorialized their understanding and agreement that
the execution of Change Order No. 2 would not waive any claim
the Owners may have had against the Contractor by reason of
the Contractor's failure to complete the project on or before
August 1, 1973.
As stated in the Statement of Facts in the second
paragraph on page 5 of the Owners' brief, on or about March
1, 1974, the parties entered into Change Order No. 4 to the
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Contract.

EX P-5 and EX P-6.

However, what the Statement

of the Owners failed to say was that by Change Order No.
4, the Contract Time as provided in the Contract was "increased as necessary to complete the work."
Contrary to the implication in the Statement of
Facts in the fourth paragraph on page 5 of the Owners'
brief, Change Order No. 4 did not constitute a new or separate
agreement between the parties, but became instead an integral
part of the Contract.

Counsel for the Owners agreed with

that proposition when he stated at trial " ... it is apparent,
certainly, by the wording, that the change orders become
incorporated into the contract."

T 37.

Other than as stated above, the Contractor agrees
with the Statement of Facts as contained in the Owners'
brief.

However, the record establishes one additional fact

relevant to the Owners' appeal but not mentioned in their
brief, viz:
On or about March 8, 1974, six months

prior to making final payment on the
Contract, the Owners executed a Certificate of Substantial Completion pursuant to which they accepted the subject
nursing facility as substantially complete and assumed full possession thereof as of that date. EX P-7.
With respect to the Contractor's Cross-Appeal, the
material facts are as follows:
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On or about July 15, 1975, in paragraphs 3 and 6
of their Answer and Counterclaim, the Owners denied that
they "voluntarily" executed and delivered the promissory
note of September 9, 1974 (the "Note"), and alleged that
the Note was signed by them only as a result of the Contractor's duress.

On or about May 20, 1976, Owner, Connie M. Davis,
stated with respect to the Note in her sworn Affidavit the
following:
"2. That at the insistence of the plaintiff's
agent, John Price, I executed the Promissory
Note in question some time before September 11,
1973, but that I would not have executed said
Note but for his assertions that he could not
and would not complete a nursing home facility
under a Contract which was dated August 28, 1972,
until I executed said Promissory Note."

On or about May 20, 1976, Owner, Richard J. Davis,
stated with respect to the Note in his sworn Affidavit the
following:
"2. That some time prior to September 11,
1973 (sic), the plaintiff, by and through
its agent, John Price, approached me and
said to the effect that he could not complete
the Contract dated August 28, 1972 for the
construction of a nursing home facility pursuant to plans and specifications for the
sum agreed upon of $720,000.00 without my
signing a Promissory Note in the amount of
$10,708.39.
3.
That but for John Price's insistence
that he could not and would not complete the
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project unless the Note were signed, I would
not have executed the Note which was signed
by me some time before September 11, 1973 (sic)."
On or about July 8, 1976 in their sworn Answer to
the Contractor's Interrogatory No. 1, the Owners stated the
following:

"On February 19, 1974, Change Order No. 4
was presented to your affiants for signature
by the plaintiff to increase to $722,282.00
the original Contract amount, to pay for
additional hardware on the doors of the nursing home facility as ordered by the State
Fire Marshal. This Change Order was never
executed by your affiants." (Emphasis added)
On or about September 19, 1977, Owner, Richard J.
Davis, stated in his sworn Affidavit the following:
"2. That to the best of his recollection,
the document entitled 'Change Order No. 4'
was sent to his address for his signature
on or about March 1, 1974 ....

5.
That your affiant does not remember
any typing at the bottom of Change Order
No, 4, and particularly does not remember
the words typed in said document at the
time he signed the same with the following
wording: 'The Contract time will be increased as necessary to complete the work.'
6.
That it was your affiant's practice
to initial any wording to a contract which
may have been crossed out, or any additional
wording to a contract, but your affiant did
not initial the crossing out of the wording
and the adding of the new words described
in paragraph 5 above on Change Order No. 4;
however, your affiant believes that he would
have initialed the same had he been present
at the time they were presented to him."
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On or about October 11, 1976, Owner, Richard J.
Davis, testified under oath at his deposition with respect
to the Note as follows:

"Q

You say Mrs. Davis and yourself went
into Dangerfield's to sign that note?

A

Yes.

Q

He prepared it and you went in and signed

it?

A
Yes. I believe that I have only been in
his office that one time.

Q

But you went in and signed the note?

A

Yes.

Q

Was there any way he twisted your arm
to sign it?

A

No.

Q

Was it an involuntary signing in any

way?
A
Well, I thought that was the easiest
way out, making payments per month rather
than the full sum.

Q

Any undue influence by Mr. Dangerfield
to make you sign it?

A

No.

Q

Any coercion or undue influence brought
upon your wife to sign it?

A

No.

Q

How about the mortgage?

A

No.
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Q

Anybody make any threats to you if you
didn't?

A

No.

Q
Did you authorize him to deliver that
note back to John Price Associates?
A

Did he deliver it?

I

don't know.

Q

Well, I think we'll find correspondence
that he did and in your affidavit you said
you thought he did.
A

Okay, then why ask me that question?

Q

I just want to know your best recollection of it.

A

Yes.

Q

Mr. Davis, you have indicated in certain documents on file in this action that
somehow John Price Associates coerced or exerted undue duress upon yourself and Mrs.
Davis with respect to this matter.

A
Well, I don't think they're undue. All
I keep saying is that the work wasn't completed. The contract was never completed
on time and the interest rates went up and
I lost the deal. That's what I claim. By
the interest rates going up, I couldn't find
anybody to loan me the money.

Q
I imagine you have the same complaints
Mrs. Davis has about what John Price has done
to delay the matter but in terms of undue duress or influence upon you and Mrs. Davis,
was there any undue duress or influence that
was put upon you to sign that last note?
MR. SPRATLING: Counsel, are you referring
to a specific-THE WITNESS: Turnbow called me.
the guy's name?

Isn't that
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Q
(By Mr. Linebaugh:) I'm just telling
you that the documents filed by you and
your counsel in this case indicate that
you claimed you had some improper influence or duress imposed upon you by John
Price Associates.
A
Well, sure, that fellow down there,
that bookkeeper, called up all the time
and said I had to sign a note there for
them.

Q

How does that make it improper duress
or undue influence or-A

Well, he has called up all the time.

Q

How did John Price Associates or any
of its employees exercise their strong
will over your weak will?
A
Well, they have got a lot more money
then I have.
MR. SPRATLING: I'm going to have to object. Where are you referring to coercion
in the counterclaim?
MR. LINEBAUGH: You have an affirmative,
duress, counsel. I'm talking about anyplace
it appears, and it appears in the affidavit,
in the pleadings, and in the answers to interrogatories, counsel.
MR. SPRATLING: If you allow me to point
out to my client it may be--

Q
(By Mr. Linebaugh:) If John Price
Associates has exercised some undue influence over Mr. Davis, it seems to me he
ought to be able to tell us.
A
Well, they called me down a couple of
times, I think it's Turnbow, in discussing
matters--! mean all kinds of matters. I
went over to his office, Turnbow's, two or
three times.
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Q

I'm giving you a chance to give us
your best possible shot at us, the thing
that's going to convince the jury that
.Tohn Price Associates really took advantage of the Davises.
A
Because they didn't do their work and
complete the contract on time.

Q
How does that in any way convince you
you ought to sign the promissory note?
A

Well, John Price is a good friend of
the head of the bank downstairs.

Q

Go on, take your best shot.

A
Yes. I think they got together and
made these extensions go on. I didn't want
the extensions to go on.

Q

Anything else?

A

No."

(Deposition of Richard J. Davis, page 41, line 18 through
page 45, line 7.)
On or about October 11, 1976, Owner, Richard J.
Davis, testified at his deposition with respect to Change
Order No. 4 as follows:

"Q

Directing your attention to Answer to
Interrogatory Number One on page three, the
second paragraph. It says, 'On February 19,
1974, change order number four was presented
to your affiants for signature by the plaintiff to increase to $722,282, the original
contract amount, to pay for additional hardware on the doors of the nursing home facility as ordered by the State Fire Marshal.
This change order was never executed by your
affiants.' I take it based on evidence produced it was never executed by Mrs. Davis,
but you did execute change order number four.
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MR. SPRATLING:
the doors?

Is this on the hardware or

MR. LINEBAUGH:
four.

This is change order number

MR. SPRATLING:

That hasn't got anything to

do with this.

THE WITNESS: Not for just the hardware.
That's not right there.

MR. SPRATLING:

I think that was the amount.
That was two thousand something, $2,282.

Q

(By Mr. Linebaugh:) In any case, yourself and Mrs. Davis' answer that says, 'This
order was never executed by your affiants'
is in error; is that right?
A

Yes.

I did sign it?

MRS. DAVIS:

Yes, he did sign it."

(Deposition of Richard J. Davis, page 84, line 19 through
page 85, line 15.)

On or about October 11, 1976, Owner, Connie M.
Davis, testified at her deposition with respect to Change
Order No. 4 as follows:
"Q
(By Mr. Linebaugh:) Now, I show you
what has been marked as Exhibit 28, which
is a change order number four, dated February
19, 1974, and ask you if you have ever seen
that document before?

A
Yes. I think we did see this one because this is part of what we had to pay,
was the hardware; isn't it?

MR. DAVIS:
THE WITNESS:
list.

I paid the hardware.
Or maybe I haven't seen that
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Q

(By Mr. Linebaugh:) Is it fair to say
that at the time you saw this change order,
the original of this change order--

A
I'm not sure I did see it. I was aware
of the problem, but I'm not sure I saw that
specific change order. I'm going to say no,
I didn't see it.

Q
With respect to the date of it, then,
which is February 19, 1974, at least that's
when Carl Olson signed it; and then your architect signed it on March l, 1974, according to the copy.
A

Yes.

Q
As of those dates it is fair to say you
had a lease with Hillhaven; is it not?
A

Yes.

Q
And as part of your lease with Hillhaven,
you are to furnish them this building; is that
right?
A

Yes.

Q
And is it fair to say that the changes
that were described in this change order were
to be included in the building that was the
subject of your lease with Hillhaven?
MR. SPRATLING: She will not know that. I
think when they talked about this, this hardware was acceptable. I think it was a later
change. I'm going to object to the question.
MR. LINEBAUGH: I don't think it was in the
original plans or the specs. I think these
were later changes requested by Hillhaven
regardless of when they came into being.

Q
(By Mr. Linebaugh:) Were these in fact
not-required by your tenant?
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A
I don't know. I don't know whether
it was the tenant that required them or
the Fire Marshal or whoever required them.
I just know that they were required.

Q
Well, it says, 'Furnish and install
additional hardware on doors as directed
by State Fire Marshal.' And you agreed to
pick up the cost of that; did you not?
A

Yes.

Q

And this is the change order to accomplish that purpose; is that fair to say?

A

Yes, that·' s probably fair to say.

Q

And do you have any quarrel with this
change order?

A

No.

Q

Do you know whether you have ever paid
that amotmt of money to John Price and Associates, the $2,282?

A
I think we did but I'm not going to say
positively. I would have to look that up in
my records.

Q

This change order also says, 'The contract time will be increased as necessary
to complete the work.' Do you have any
quarrel with that provision?
MR. SPRATLING:

Where does it say that?

MR. LINEBAUGH: Just above the signature
marks, counsel.
MR. SPRATLING:

This is tmsigned.

MR. LINEBAUGH: I know it's unsigned, but I
just asked her if she has any quarrel with
it, whether she signed it or not.
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MR. SPRATLING: She stated time and time
again that she thought they dillydallied
around.
MR. LINEBAUGH: I want to know, counsel.
This is the crucial question. Did she agree
as of this date that the contract time could
be increased as necessary to complete this
work; did you agree to that:
THE WITNESS: I didn't feel it was necessary to increase the contract time because
it was so overtime now that this little bit
of changing of hardware could not have made
much difference.

Q

(By Mr. Linebaugh:)
agree to that?

A

And you did not

I did not.

Q
And if your husband did, he would have
been crazy?
A
I did not say that and you are putting
words in my mouth.

Q

Did you and your husband discuss whether
that-was an agreeable term between you, as
to whether the contract could be extended to
complete that as necessary?

A
Yes. We discussed it and we decided no,
we would not give any extensions on anything.

Q

'No way,' and he said that to you?

A

And I said that to him.

MR. DAVIS:

You don't see my signature on there.
(Whereupon Plaintiff's Exhibit 29
was marked for identification.)

Q
(By Mr. Linebaugh:) I now sh~w you what
has been marked as Exhibit 29 and ask you if
you have ever seen that document before?
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A

I don't think I have seen it.

Q

Do you recognize your husband's signature on it?

A

Yes.

Q

Any reason to doubt that he signed
that document?

A

No."

(Deposition of Constance M. Davis, page 134, line 12 through
page 138, line 5.)
On or about October 11, 1976, Owner, Richard

J.

Davis, testified at his deposition with respect to the
Owners' joint interest in the subject nursing home facility
as follows:
"Q
Have you been a partner with your wife
or been just alone in them?

A
Well, my wife and I run them together
but there is no partnership."
(Deposition of Richard J. Davis, page 6, lines 13 through
16.)

"Q

With respect to the subject matter of
this lawsuit, the rest home that was the subject of the contract that we are talking
about, has your wife been extensively involved in negotiating any of these transactions along the line or was this pretty
much your project?
A

I think we worked on them together.

Q

Did you take the lead in the negotiations or did she?
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A
Oh, I think that maybe she took a lot
of the lead, yes.

Q
Has there been anything that occurred
between you that the other didn't agree to
with respect to this transaction?
A

Well, in respect to the nursing home?

Q

Yes.

A
Yes. I put it up for sale and didn't
let her know about it.

Q

Anything else that she may have disagreed with that you did in connection with
this?
A
I don't think so. You see, I didn't
own the property; she owned it."
(Deposition of Richard J. Davis, page 9, line 8 through
page 10, line 2.)

"Q

I suppose you mean you and your wife?

A

Yes.

Q

You were in this thing together?

A
Yes. But I don't have any idea when
they were supposed to be paid."
(Deposition of Richard J. Davis, page 31, lines 19 through 23.)
On or about October 11, 1976 and after Owner, Richard

J. Davis, had testified at his deposition with respect to the
Owners' joint involvement in the subject nursing home facility, Owner, Connie M. Davis, testified at her deposition as
follows:
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"Q

Now, with respect to any of the questions and answers that have been given directed to your husband and given by your
husband up to this moment, do you wish to
change any of those answers? I realize that
maybe it will be very difficult for you to
do. If something sticks out in your mind
that you know is obviously erroneous, then
let's get at it.
A
The only thing that I could say is
that most of the documents that you have
referred to that we do not have I'm sure
are on file with Cormnercial Security Bank.
I think the reason for the redoing of the
Phil-Rae Corporation lease was at the request of the S.B.A. And it was not a loan;
it was a guaranteed lease."
(Deposition of Constance M. Davis, page 10, lines 3 through 14.)
Contrary to the lower court's Memorandum Decision
of October 20, 1977, the Owners' depositions were used to
rebut their contention at trial that the Owners were not
jointly involved in the subject transaction.

T 51-53.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE
CONTRACTOR'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT.
At page 2 of their brief, the Owners imply that
the trial court's Order directing a verdict in favor of the
Contractor somehow summarily cut off the Owners from presenting their case in chief.

However, the Contractor's Motion
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for a Directed Verdict was not made until after the Owners
had rested their case.

T 53 and 54.

The Owners rested

their case because the trial court sustained the Contractor's objection to the admissibility of any evidence relating to any breaches of contract, which breaches allegedly occurred prior to March 1, 1974, the date of
Change Order No. 4, and/or final payment of the Contractor on or about September 12, 1974.

Thus, the real is-

sue in this case is whether the trial court correctly sustained the objection.

The Contractor contends that the

trial court correctly sustained the objection for two
reasons:

(1) Change Order No. 4 superseded Change Order

No. 2; and (2) by payment of all sums due the Contractor,
the Owners waived any claim they may have had for

unsatis~

factory prosecution of the work.

A.
NO. 2.

CHANGE ORDER NO. 4 SUPERSEDED

CHA.~GE

ORDER

At page 7 of their brief, the Owners concede that

Change Orders l, 2 and 4 "were executed by the parties."
Change Orders number 2 and 4 are the only ones pertinent
to the issues now before the court.
At pages 8 through the first paragraph on page
10 of their brief, the Owners cite several authorities for
the proposition that written suLsequent amendments, alterations and/or modifications of a written contract and/or
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written changes thereto, will supersede the earlier documents.

The proposition is elementary and clearly supports

the Contractor's contention that Change Order No. 4 superseded Change Order No. 2 to the extent that the provisions
of both are inconsistent.
When the parties entered into the Contract on
August 28, 1972, they agreed that:
"8.1 The Contract Documents consist of
this Agreement (which includes the
general conditions), Supplementary
and other Conditions, the Drawings,
the Specifications, all Addenda issued prior to the execution of this
Agreement, all Amendments, Change
Orders, and written interpretations
of the Contract Documents issued by
the Architect. These form the Contract and what is required br any
one shall be as binding as i required by all. The intention of
the Contract Documents is to include all labor, materials, equipment and other items as provided
in paragraph 11.2 necessary for
the proper execution and completion of the Work, and the terms
and conditions of payment therefor,
and also to include all Work which
may be reasonably inferable from the
Contract Documents as being necessary to produce the intended results.

8.3

The term "Work" as used in the Contract Documents includes all labor
necessary to produce the construction required by the Contract Documents and all materials and equipment
incorporated or to be incorporated in
such construction." (Emphasis added)
EX D-3, paragraphs 8.1 and 8.3.
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From the foregoing, it is apparent that "Change Orders"
were considered "Contract Documents" and were integrated
into the "Contract."

It is also clear that "Work" was

a term of art when used in the Contract Documents which
together formed the Contract.
The Contract also provided:
"16.2

If the Contractor is delayed at
any time in the progress of the
Work by changes ordered in the
Work, by labor disputes, fire,
unusual delay in transportation,
unavoidable casualties, causes
beyond the Contractor's control,
or by any cause which the Architect may determine justifies the
delay, then the Contract Time
shall be extended by Change
Order for such reasonable time
as the Architect may determine.

22.1

The Owner without invalidating the
Contract may order Changes in the
Work consisting of additions, deletions or modifications, the Contract Sum and the Contract Time
being adjusted accordingly. All
such Changes in the Work shall be
authorized by written Change Order
signed by the Owner or the Architect as his duly authorized agent.

22.2

From the foregoing, it is apparent that "Contract Sum" and "Contract Time" were terms of art when
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used in the Contract Documents, which Contract Documents
included Change Orders.
On August 27, 1973, in Change Order No. 2, the
Owners expressly reserved "any claim which they may have
against Contractor by reason of Contractor's failure to
complete the project on or before August 1, 1973."
phasis added).

(Em-

However, over six months later, on March l,

1974, the Owners and their Architect agreed to Change
Order No. 4 which expressly provided that "the Contract
Time will be increased as necessary to complete the work."
EX P-6.

There can be no question but what Change Order

No. 4 was an amendment as to both the Contract Sum and
the Contract Time provided for in the Contract.

This is

clear from the fact that Change Order No. 4 expressly
indicates that it is a Change Order with respect to a
Contract dated August 28, 1972 for the "Davis Nursing
Home" and that the original Contract Sum of $720,000.00
would be increased to $722,282.00.
The Owners argue that even though Change Order
No. 4 changed the Contract, it did not supersede the
express reservation of a potential claim provided for in
Change Order No. 2.

The obvious answer to that is that

the Contractor simply cannot be held responsible for not
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completing the Work on August 1, 1973 when the Owners
contracted for additional labor and materials over six
months later.

Note that Change Order No. 4 did not

merely extend the Contract Time as did Change Order No.
2, but Change Order No. 4 also obligated the Contractor to furnish additional labor and materials as well
as obligated the Owners for an additional Contract Sum
and enough additional Contract Time to complete the Work.
In other words, the Work as contemplated by the original Contract was amended to include the additional work
as contemplated by Change Order No. 4 and it was impossible for the Contractor, by August 1, 1973, to have done
the Work as contemplated by the Contract DocUI!lents taken
as a whole.

Consequently, it does not make sense to say

that any claim reserved by Change Order No. 2 would not
be abrogated by Change Order No. 4.
it does not make sense any other way.

On

the contrary,
How can the Owners

be allowed on the one hand to collect damages from the Contractor for failure to complete the Work by August 1,
1973 and at the same time obligate the Contractor to include in that Work additional labor and materials that
were not even ordered until more than six months later.
Remember, "Work" has a well defined meaning in the Contract and Change Order No. 4, and there is nothing in
Change Order No. 2 that changes that meaning.
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Not only did the Owners agree to Change Order
No. 4, but a week later on March 8, 197L;, the Owners
executed a Certificate of Substantial Completion.
P-7.

EX

Neither Change Order No. 4 nor the Certificate of

Substantial Completion reserved in any way any claim in
favor of the Owners based on the Contractor's failure to
prosecute the Work to completion by August 1, 1973.
Under such circumstances, the case_ law clearly es tab"."
lishes the proposition that the Owners waived their alleged claim.

In Steenberg Construction Co. v. Prepakt

Concrete Co., 381 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1967), the court
had under consideration a subcontract with respect to
c-0nstruction of the earthen dam at Lost Creek, Utah.
At the insistence of the subcontractor, the parties had
negotiated an additional provision to the subcontract
which stated:

"Progress schedule date to be mutually

agreed upon in writing ... "

The subcontractor contended

that it was released from any of its obligations under
the subcontract because the parties never did agree in
writing to any progress schedule.

However, Judge Murrah,

writing for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that
the subcontractor waived the requirement of a written
work schedule by the subcontractor's subsequent execution of a performance bond and its oral agreement to
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perform the subcontract pursuant to a work schedule not
agreed to in writing.

In the case at bar, there is also

a contract modification insisted upon by the Owners (Change
Order No. 2), but there is also the subsequent written
modification agreed to by the parties (Change Order No.
4).

If the oral agreement in SteenbeE_g constituted a

waiver,

~

fortiorL the Owners waived the subject claim

by the written provisions of Change Order No. 4 and the
Certificate of Substantial Completion.
Further, as late as 1974 in a case similar
to the one now before the court, the Colorado Supreme
Court has held in Rockwell v. Mountain View Electric
Association, Inc.,

co.

, 521 P.2d 1272 (1974)

that the execution of change orders can reasonably be
considered acts inconsistent with an alleged intent to
hold a contractor to the requirements of a provision
requiring completion of a construction project by a
time certain.
While the execution of Change Order No. 2 did
not cause the Owners to waive any claim based on the
Contractor's failure to complete the project by August
1, 1973, the execution of the subsequent documents surely
constituted such a waiver.

Accordingly, it would have

-24-
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been a waste of time for the trial court to admit evidence before the jury with respect to whether the Contractor justifiably failed to complete the Work by August
1, 19i3.

There are three errors in the Owners' brief
which should be noted:

(1) In the next to the last para-

graph on page 7, the Owners indicate that the completion
date was extended by Change Order No. 2 to a date beyond
"August 1, 1977;" however, the date which appears twice
in that paragraph should be "August 1, 1973."

EX D-10;

(2) in the next to the last paragraph on page 11, the
Owners contend that the Contractor conceded at trial
"that the provisions of Change Order Number Two would
still be alive, except for the payoff by the Owners of
the Contract on September 12, 1974;" however, a reading
of all of the last three-quarters of page 46 of the
trial transcript (although less than a complete transcript of all that was said), indicates that the Contractor made no such concession; and (3) in the last sentence
of the last paragraph on page 11, the Owri.ers stated:
"the Contractor, knowing it was in default, still agreed
to be liable to the Owner for delay damages, while at the
same time seeking an extension in which to complete the
Contract;" however, there is nothing in the record to
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indicate that the Contractor admitted at any time that
it was in default, nor is there anything in the record
to indicate that the Contractor agreed to be liable to
the Owners for delay damages, even though the Contractor did agree that as of August 27, 1973, the Owners
had reserved any claim they "may" have had against the
Contractor.

EX D-10.

B.

BY PAYMENT OF ALL SUMS DUE THE CONTRAC-

TOR, THE OWNERS WAIVED ANY CLAIM THEY MAY HAVE HAD FOR
UNSATISFACTORY PROSECUTION OF THE WORK.

At page 12 of

their brief, the Owners concede that paragraph 17.4 of
the original Contract "provides that final payment by
the Owner does constitute a waiver of all claims of
the Owner against the Contractor, with four exceotions,
none of which probably apply here."

(Emphasis added).

The Owners then contend that Change Order No. 2 constituted a "fifth exception" to the waiver provided for in
paragraph 17.4.
Subsequent to August 27, 1973, the date of
Change Order No. 2, the Owners agreed to the provisions
of Change Order No. 4, EX P-6; the Certificate of Substantial Completion, EX P-7; the letter of September
4, 1974 from Owner, Richard J. Davis, to Cormnercial
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Security Bank authorizing the bank to make final payment to the Contractor, EX P-8; and the letter of
September 12, 1974 from Commercial Security Bank to the
Contractor transmitting such final payment, EX P-9.
However, there is nothing in any of such subsequent
documents preserving any such fifth exception.
It is one thing to say that by entering into
Change Order No. 2 that the Owners did not waive any
claim they may have had for the Contractor's failure to
complete the Work by August 1, 1973, and quite another
thing to say that final payment over a year later and
over nine months after the November 30, 1973 completion
deadline of Change Order No. 2, and over six months after
Change Order No. 4 and the Certificate of Substantial
Completion, did not waive any such claim pursuant to the
plain language of paragraph 17.4 of the Contract.

Note

that paragraph 17.4 says that final payment constitutes
the waiver, and note also that Change Order No. 2 expressly provides that the construction lender would continue to disburse "funds for construction purposes per
the terms and conditions of the Contract." (Emphasis
added).

There is nothing in Change Order No. 2 that

indicates that paragraph 17.4 does not mean precisely
what it says.

This court has previously held that "no
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damage" clauses in construction contracts (which clauses
are more harsh than the waiver clause now under consideration) mean what they say and are enforceable.

See Western

Engineers, Inc. v. State Road Commission, 20 U.2d 294, 427
P.2d 216 (1968).
The applicable rule of law with respect to waiver is included in the following from Williston on Contracts:
" 'Where timely performance is of the
essence of the contract, a party who
does any act inconsistent with the
supposition that he continues to hold
the other party to his part of the
agreement will be taken to have waived
it altogether. When a specific time
is fixed for the performance of a contract and is of the essence of the
contract and it is not performed by
that time, but the parties proceed
with the performance of it after that
time, the right to suddenly insist
upon a forfeiture for failure to perform within the specified time will
be deemed to have been waived and the
time for performance will be deemed
to have been extended for a reasonable time.' " 6 Williston, Contracts,
§856 p. 232 (3d ed. 1962)
In the instant case, the execution and delivery of Change
Order No. 4, the Certificate of Substantial Completion,
the letter of September 4, 1974, and the letter and
final payment of September 12, 1974, all constitute
acts "inconsistent with the supposition that" t:ie Owners
continued to hold the Contractor to the August 1, 1973
completion date.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-28-

In light of the provisions of paragraph 17.4
of the Contract, final payment alone surely constituted
the Owners' waiver.

In Milaeger Well Drilling Co. v.

Muskego Rendering Co., 1 Wis.2d 573, 85 N.W.2d 331 (1957),
it was held that even a partial payment effectively waived
unreserved claims known to the owner at the time of partial payment.

Here, the Owners clearly knew about their

alleged claim, but just as clearly made final payment
on the Contract without any reservation of such claim.
Based upon the fact that the Owners made final
payment on the Contract as provided in paragraph 17.4
thereof, such final payment clearly waived any claim the
Owners may have had for the Contractor's unjustifiable
failure to complete the project by August 1, 1973.

Ac-

cordingly, the trial court was correct in ruling that
evidence on that issue was irrelevant and immaterial.

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
TAX THE COSTS OF TAKING THE OWNERS'
DEPOSITIONS.
The Contractor is aware that in order to recover the costs of the Owners' depositions, the burden
is upon the Contractor to establish that such depositions
were necessary and reasonable and that whether that
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burden was met was within the sound discretion of the
lower court.

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v.

Wright,~ U.~,521

P.2d 563 (1974).

However, the

Contractor contends that the lower court's Memorandum
Decision on this issue was arbitrary or a clear abuse
of the court's discretion.
The subject Memorandum Decision was not made
until after the trial and judgment with respect to the
Owners' Counterclaim, and the lower court's finding that
the depositions were not used at trial is directly contrary to the trial transcript.

The Owners' depositions

were used at trial to rebut the Owners' contention that
Owner, Richard J. Davis, was not acting for Owner, Connie
M. Davis, with respect to the subject transaction.
The error of the lower court is further demonstrated by the fact that prior to the taking of the
Owners' depositions, the Owners had taken the position
under oath in affidavits and in answers to interrogatories
that:

(1) the Note had been signed under duress; and (2)

that neither of the Owners had ever signed Change Order
No. 4.

Contrary to those assertions, the Owners' sub-

sequent depositions make clear that the Note was not
signed under duress and Owner, Richard J. Davis, did in
fact sign Change Order No. 4.

Further, even after the
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taking of the Owners' depositions, Owner, Richard J.
Davis, took the position under oath in a sworn affidavit that certain key provisions of Change Order No.
4 were not included in the Change Order when he signed
it.

However, that position is directly contrary to the

deposition testimony of Owner, Connie M. Davis, when
she stated under oath that the same key provisions
were in Change Order No. 4 and were discussed between
the Owners prior to the signing of such Change Order
by Owner, Richard J. Davis.
Surely it must be conceded that the duress
issue was material to the Contractor's recovery of
judgment on the Note and that whether the Owners agreed
to Change Order No. 4 was material to whether the Owners had waived the alleged cause of action described
in their Counterclaim.

In Lawson Supply Company v.

General Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 27 U.2d 821, 493
P.2d 607 (1972), this court held that the costs of
depositions may be taxed in a proper case and indicated
that the test for such determination "is whether the
deposition was necessarily obtained in the sense that
the taking of the deposition and its general content
were reasonably necessary for the development of the
case in the light of the situation then existing."

In
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Lawson it was pointed out that at least one fact was
discovered by deposition which was of great significance to the prevailing party's case.

Certainly, the

same can be said for the case at bar where the depositions not only uncovered facts of great significance,
but also uncovered facts that were directly contrary
to previous positions taken by the Owners under oath.
Note also, that in the case at bar, the Contractor did
not take the depositions of the Owners until after the
Contractor had received the Owners' response to the
Contractor's interrogatories.
Having put the Contractor to the expense of
taking their depositions because of their untruthful
affidavits and answers to interrogatories, the Contractor contends that it is entitled to have the Owners pay
for such conduct by paying for the costs of their depositions.
CONCLUSION
Because Change Order No. 4 and all of the other
subsequent documents agreed to by the Owners superseded
the reservation of any alleged claim as provided in
Change Order No. 2, and because the Owners' final payment on the Contract expressly waived any such alleged
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claim, the trial court correctly sustained the Contractor's objection to the admissibility of the Owners' evidence, and the trial court correctly granted the Contractor's Motion for a Directed Verdict after the Owners
rested their case in chief.

Accordingly, the Contractor

is entitled to have the judgment of the trial court affirmed.
Because the lower court's Memorandum Decision
of October 20, 1977 is based upon the erroneous finding
that the Owners' depositions were not used at trial and
because such Memorandum Decision apparently did not take
into consideration the practical and reasonable necessity
of the Owners' depositions in this matter, the Contractor is entitled to have judgment in its favor and against
the Owners for an additional $516.75.

Respectfully submitted,
Kent B Linebaugh
JARDINE AND BALDWIN
700 Commercial Security Bank
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 532- 7700
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this 16th day of March, 1978, two copies

of this Brief of Respondent were served upon counsel
for Defendants-Appellants by delivering such copies to
the office of David K. Smith, 4735 Highland Drive, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84117.

~·~ ~6-l ~
Kent B Linebaugh
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